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The structure/agency debate has been among the central issues in recent discussions of social theory. It has been widely assumed that the key theoretical task is to find a link between social structures and acting human beings - to reconcile the macro with the micro, society and the individual. The contributors to this book reject this solution to the problem. For them, both the concept of 'society' as an entity and the freely-acting 'individual' are theoretical fiction. Rather, the immediate task of the social sciences is to take the social world seriously, to understand the ways in which tha

Frontmatter -- CONTENTS -- Introduction -- 1. Two Conceptions of the Theory of Justice -- 2. From Practice to Theory -- 3. From Theory to Practice -- 4. Agents of Change -- 5. Against Strict Compliance -- 6. Against the Antipracticalists -- 7. Political Philosophy as Practical Reasoning -- Notes -- Acknowledgments -- Index

Agent-based models have played a prominent role in recent debates about the merits of democracy. In particular, the formal model of Lu Hong and Scott Page and the associated "diversity trumps ability" result has typically been seen to support the epistemic virtues of democracy over epistocracy (i.e., governance by experts). In this paper we first identify the modeling choices embodied in the original formal model and then critique the application of the Hong-Page results to philosophical debates on the relative merits of democracy. In particular we argue that the "best-performing agents" in the Hong-Page model should not be interpreted as experts. We next explore a closely related model in which best-performing agents are more plausibly seen as experts and show that the diversity trumps ability result fails to hold. However, with changes in other parameters (such as the deliberation dynamic) the diversity trumps ability result is restored. The sensitivity of this result to parameter choices illustrates the complexity of the link between formal modeling and more general philosophical claims; we use this debate as a platform for a more general discussion of when and how agent-based models can contribute to philosophical discussions.

12. Brutal Justice? Animal Litigation and the Question of Countertradition, by Jonathan K. Crane and Aaron S. GrossPart V: Epilogue; 13. Beastly Morality: Untangling Possibilities, by Jonathan K. Crane, Ani B. Satz, Lori Marino, and Cynthia Willett; List of Contributors; Index.

Frontmatter -- Contents -- Preface -- Part 1. BEGINNINGS -- 1. The Internalism Requirement and the Integration Test -- 2. Impartiality, Regulative Norms, and Practical Reason -- 3. The Thin Conception of Integrity and the Integration Test -- 4. An Integrity-Sensitive Conception of Human Agency, Practical Reason, and Morality -- Part 2. THE GOODS OF RESPECT -- 5. General Features and Varieties of Respect -- 6. Respect, Egoism, and Self-Assessment -- 7. The Categorical Value of the Goods of Respect -- Part 3. THE GOODS OF LOVE -- 8. General Features of Love -- 9. The Normative Thoughts of Parental Love, Part I. -- 10. The Normative Thoughts of Parental Love, Part II. -- 11. Peer Love -- 12. The Normative Thoughts of Friendship -- 13. The Normative Thoughts of Neighborly Love, Part I. -- 14. The Normative Thoughts of Neighborly Love, Part II. -- 15. Loneliness, Intimacy, and the Integration Test -- Part 4. THE GOODS OF ACTIVITY The Place of the Aesthetic in Practical Reason -- 16. Solitary Activities -- 17. Shared Activities -- 18. Normative Thoughts and the Goods of Activity -- Bibliography -- Index

Chapter 1. Introduction Chapter 2. The Concept of Agency in Childhood Studies Chapter 3. Theorising Agency Chapter 4. The Development of Children⁰́₉s Agency Chapter 5. Children⁰́₉s Agency Within Families Chapter 6. Children⁰́₉s Agency in School and with Peers Chapter 7. Children⁰́₉s Agency in the Public Sphere: Rights and Participation Chapter 8. Agency and Diversity: Variation in the Expression of Agency by Children Chapter 9. A Theoretical Synthesis References Index

A central tenet of moral individualism is that only an entity's intrinsic (non-relational) properties can ground moral status because only intrinsic properties give rise to agent-neutral reasons. However, I show that the two main approaches to making the agent-neutral/agent-relative distinction fail to exclude morally salient relational (extrinsic) properties from giving rise to agent-neutral reasons. As such, moral individualism accounts of moral status are false. Further, arguments that depend on moral individualism's central tenet—like the argument from "marginal" cases—are unable to defend their thesis by merely claiming that special relations cannot ground moral status.

Agent-based modeling has become a common and well-established tool in the social sciences and certain of the humanities. Here, we aim to provide an overview of the different modeling approaches in current use. Our discussion unfolds in two parts: we first classify different aspects of the model-building process and identify a number of characteristics shared by most agent-based models in the humanities and social sciences; then we map relevant differences between the various modeling approaches. We classify these into different dimensions including the type of target systems addressed, the intended modeling goals, and the models' degree of abstraction. Along the way, we provide reference to related debates in contemporary philosophy of science.